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Abstract 
This paper reviews a large body of regulatory literature and applies four major debates to the field of 
building regulation and control. We find that this field has attracted little attention of regulatory 
scholars, whilst fields such as the ‘natural’ or ‘occupational’ environment are often addressed in 
regulatory studies. We furthermore find that studies of building regulation and control often lack 
theoretical descriptions or applications. We argue that such application is necessary for a better 
understanding of building regulations and control. 
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Towards a better understanding of building regulation 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In a paper by Rob Imrie, published in a recent issue of this journal, an architect expresses his feelings 
towards building regulation by sharing a thought: “I think a lot of our architectural life is actually 
dominated by regulations. I mean, you’re prescribed, almost as soon as you start building, by 
regulations of one sort or another.” (Imrie, 2007). Though not analysed by Imrie in that same paper, 
it might very well be that this type of feeling lives among other players in the building industry as 
well.  
Present day building regulation in developed countries can trace its origins to nineteenth 
century urbanism when conditions such as poor housing conditions and unsanitary and unhealthy 
environments prompted governments to intervene in the building and construction trades. Since the 
nineteenth century, regulation has been adapted to suit contemporary needs and, worldwide, 
present day building regulation covers a broad range of topics, such as safety, public health, amenity 
and sustainability – see, for instance, present day building regulations in the United States (ICC, 
2006), Australia (ABCB, 2004), Canada (NRCC, 2005) and different European countries (Sheridan et 
al., 2002).  The implementation of building regulations and building control – referred to as 
“enforcement” in this paper – has also been subject to change. The contemporary trend is the 
introduction of private sector enforcement agencies to governmental enforcement regimes in 
countries such as Australia (ABCB, 1999), Canada (BCMH, 2007), New Zealand (Hunn, 2002; Yates, 
2003) and parts of Europe (Meijer and Visscher, 2006; Meijer et al., 2003). It is expected that this 
private sector involvement in building regulatory regimes will only expand in future years (ibid). 
It is therefore notable that building regulation appears a neglected subject in the studies of 
regulation; but also in studies from the field of urban planning and design. From a survey of a 
random sample of five leading magazines from journals in ‘the Construction and Building Technology 
category’ (Building Research International; Environment and Planning B; Structural Safety; the 
Journal of Safety Research; and the Journal of Construction Engineering and Management) we 
learned that out of roughly 2800 articles published between 1997 and 2007, only 15 dealt with the 
topic of building regulations, taking the discussion beyond that of case or ‘best-practice’ descriptions. 
Yet, even in these 15 papers almost no attention was given to the generalization of findings or 
theory-building. 
 A better understanding of building regulation might help to understand the outcomes of the 
changes that have been and will be introduced in building regulatory regimes worldwide. An 
evaluation and comparison of these regimes could provide valuable information to governments that 
face the challenge of changing their building regulatory regimes. The goal of this paper is to 
contribute to the understanding of building regulation by applying debates from regulatory literature 
to international examples of building regulatory regimes. 
 In the remainder of this paper we introduce four main debates in contemporary regulatory 
literature: the quality of law; enforcement strategies; enforcement styles; and enforcement actors. 
By applying these debates to different international examples and experiences we consider to what 
extent these bear out the ‘lessons’ that can be learned from regulatory literature. Finally we draw up 
a number of propositions in order to state expectations of changes in building regulatory regimes 
based on the literature reviewed. These propositions might be a point of departure for future 
research on building regulatory regimes. 
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2 The search for ‘optimal’ regulation 
 
It is generally understood that rules and regulations are needed to guarantee both individual and 
public interests (cf. Supiot, 2007). Regulation can thus be understood as a guideline for the course of 
social action and interaction - to make it predictable (Burns and Flam, 1987: 55). In order to make 
regulation work however, it has to be enforced (e.g. Giddens, 1984, 18; Weber, 1964 [1921], 126-
153). The whole of regulation and enforcement as a ‘means for achieving regulatory goals’ can be 
referred to as ‘regulatory regime’ (May, 2007, 9). 
 Regulation and enforcement has been a topic of many regulatory studies and many theories 
have been drawn up (for an extensive overview, see Baldwin and Cave, 1999). This search for 
‘optimal’ regulation might help to gain a better understanding of changes in the field of building 
regulation. It would be far beyond the scope of this paper to provide a complete overview of these 
studies and theories; we will therefore focus on introducing four major debates in regulatory 
literature as these seem to us most valuable for gaining a better understanding of building 
regulation.  
 
2.1 Quality of rules 
 
A question arising from debates on the quality of rules is whether rules will lead to compliance (e.g. 
Bardach and Kagan, 1982; Griffiths, 2003). Characteristics analysed are adequacy, feasibility, legal 
certainty and adaptability (van Rooij, 2006: 32-43). As the reader will notice, these characteristics 
overlap with the discussions introduced in sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 of this paper. 
 Adequacy signifies the extent to which the formal goals of regulations are fulfilled when 
these are being complied with (Hoogerwerf and Herweijer, 2003). Adequacy furthermore signifies 
that sanctions of regulations should be compelling (van Rooij, 2006: 33). Compliance is generally 
considered to come from the regulatee’s fear of the consequences of non-compliance; the 
regulatee’s insight that compliance serves the personal interest; and the regulatee’s insight that 
regulations are legitimate and therefore have to be complied with (Burgstaller, 2005, see also, Kagan 
and Scholtz, 1984). 
 Feasibility signifies the regulatee’s ability to comply with the regulations (Scholz, 1984: 391-
392). The regulatee’s ability to comply might be limited due to a physical or economic inability to do 
so, or due to non-familiarity with the regulations (Greer and Downey, 1981; Prinsen and Vossen, 
2003). Also the regulatee’s willingness to comply with regulations seems an important aspect (Erp, 
2005; May, 2004). Regulatees are sometimes regarded as calculating actors who react or respond to 
regulations based on issues such as the chance of getting caught when breaking rules, or the chance 
of being disciplined if caught (LEEC, 2004; Prinsen and Vossen, 2003; Scholz, 1984). Feasibility also 
signifies that regulations can be enforced (van Rooij, 2006: 37). Enforcement agencies have a limited 
capacity and therefore not all action can be supervised. Furthermore, some rule breaking is easier to 
detect than others (Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998; Kagan, 1994), particularly in the case of 
building regulation, this appears to be a relevant issue as controlling building regulations often 
demands specific technical knowledge or the right timing for inspections as much construction work 
is ‘covered up’ behind walls, ceilings and floors. 
 Certainty signifies there is little misunderstanding of what the regulations mean and how 
they are enforced (Bardach and Kagan, 1982: chapter 3; Scholz, 1984: 386-387; van Rooij, 2006: 38-
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39), in the light of performance-based building codes, again a relevant issue in building regulation. To 
increase competition and support innovation, many countries around the world have moved from 
prescriptive building regulations towards performance-based building codes (Meacham et al., 2005). 
The traditional prescriptive regulations prescribe how regulations must be complied with. A typical 
feature of performance-based building regulations is: 
 
 ‘the explicit statement of goals and objectives that reflect societal expectations and desires, 
along with functional statements, operative requirements and in some cases performance 
criteria, which are to be used to demonstrate that goals and objectives have been met’ 
(Meacham et al., 2005: 92).  
 
The regulatory focus is no longer on how compliance is reached, but that compliance is reached. The 
danger in this type of regulation might be found in its highly complex nature (Spence, 2004: 401) and 
a missing link between regulation and methods to test compliance and the overall accountability of 
the system (Meacham et al., 2005). These findings seem to be underpinned by a comparative study 
on building safety in New Zealand and fire safety in the US (May, 2007). From this study, it was found 
that evaluation criteria to assess performance were missing; government agencies responsible for 
compliance assessment were lacking expertise to carry out enforcement; and accountability of the 
systems were questioned due to issues in professional judgement and the exercise of professional 
judgement. 
 Adaptability, finally, signifies the regulations’ ability to be adjusted to specific actual and 
future circumstances (van Rooij, 2006: 40). It is argued that more open regulations give the regulatee 
the freedom to find a cost-efficient way of complying with regulations (Bardach and Kagan, 1982). In 
terms of performance-based building regulations, this has been one of the reasons for introducing 
this type of regulation in many countries (Meacham et al., 2005). Adaptation also signifies the 
regulators’ ability to adjust enforcement to specific circumstances (van Rooij, 2006: 42). This issue 
will be dealt with more extensively in sections 2.3 and 2.4. 
 
2.3 Enforcement strategy 
 
The term enforcement strategy is often used to describe tactical choices made by enforcement 
agencies and the type of actions these agencies take (e.g: Bardach and Kagan, 1982; Hawkins, 1984; 
Kagan, 1994; May and Burby, 1998). Tactical choices mostly refer to issues such as allocating 
resources, setting targets and monitoring outcomes (e.g. Mueller, 2003: chapter 16). Types of action 
mostly refer to issues such as sanctions and incentives (e.g. Kagan, 1994).  
 
Tactical choices 
 
Setting targets and monitoring policy outcomes is often regarded as a difficult task in daily practice. 
Goals underlying regulations often appear to be ‘plural, conflicting or vague’ (Herweijer, 1987: 181), 
or are not stated officially at all (e.g. Dunn, 2003: 135-137). Outcomes are often impossible to 
measure. For building regulation, a policy goal might be structural safety and the prevention of fatal 
construction-related incidents. Measuring these incidents is, of course, impossible when incidents do 
not occur. Much policy does not supply a number of units of output, or targets; and therefore 
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efficiency of the agency implementing that policy is difficult, if not impossible, to monitor (Mueller, 
2003: chapter 16). 
 
Types of action 
 
Sometimes, division is made between deterrence-based strategies and compliance-based strategies 
(e.g. Hawkins, 1984; Scholz, 1984). The deterrence-based strategy aims at deterring non-compliance 
prior to the law being broken (Reiss, 1984) or aims at sanctioning non-compliance after the law has 
been broken (Hawkins, 1984); the consequences of non-compliance have to be feared (e.g. Ogus, 
2002). A central hypothesis within this strategy forms the notion that the higher the chance of 
getting caught breaking the law and/or the higher the sanctions if the law is broken, the less willing 
people are to break it (Coolsma and Wiering, 1999). Critics of this strategy state that it is ineffective 
and expensive, it brings about problems with enforcement and it aims too much at end-of-pipe 
solutions (e.g. Fairman and Yapp, 2005: 493) The system is also said to be prone to regulatory 
capture (Baldwin and Cave, 1999: 36-37). 
 The compliance-based strategy aims at the spontaneous obedience of regulations (Hawkins, 
1984; Kagan, 1994) and aspires to maximum effectiveness of public means and activities by 
encouraging those features that bring about spontaneous obedience and weakening those features 
that bring about non-compliance (Parker, 2000). Spontaneous obedience is considered to proceed 
from feelings of moral disapproval about breaking the law (Tyler, 1990). 
 Instead of using negative incentives, such as fines and penalties, compliance can also be 
reached through positive incentives. According to this positive incentive approach, compliance can 
be influenced by deploying grants or subsidies (Baldwin and Cave, 1999: 41-42). The advantages of 
this strategy are said to be a low risk of capture; regulatees have a choice between the costs of non-
compliance and the benefits of compliance; regulatees are stimulated to reduce harassment as much 
as possible, down to  zero if possible, instead of to a prescribed level. Nevertheless, the model is also 
said to have disadvantages: regulations based on incentives are often very complex; incentive 
regimes work indirectly and might therefore react too late; it is difficult to measure the actual effect 
of the incentive; and public concern may arise as to why some harmful action is nevertheless being 
accepted.  
A special variety of incentive-based regime is the link between insurance premiums to 
performance records; so-called insurance-based incentives (Baldwin and Cave, 1999: 53-55). In this 
model, insurance can be obtained if compliance with regulations is proved. This model is said to have 
the same advantages and disadvantages as the incentive-based regime, yet, Baldwin and Cave stress 
the question of whether a choice has to be made for public or private actors providing insurance. 
Private sector regulators might discriminate between the insured, which could mean certain policy 
goals are not secured. This variety is sometimes considered to have considerable potential in building 
regulatory enforcement; especially as insurances can be used in various ways (Comerio, 2004: 411; 
Spence, 2004: 401). For instance, compliance with regulations might be a precondition to obtaining 
an insurance policy, or the proof of holding an insurance policy is made a condition for obtaining a 
building permit – a situation that exists in France (Meijer et al., 2003).  
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Mixing strategies 
 
Under a traditional regime, the government sets regulations and enforces these. The most traditional 
structure is a command-and-control regime based on negative incentives (e.g. Kagan, 1984). This 
regime  has, however, been subject to much criticism as it is considered to be liable to capture and it 
is likely to result in over-regulation. Compliance standards furthermore are difficult to set and 
difficult to enforce (Baldwin and Cave, 1999: 36-39). Critics of this regime therefore promote 
alternative regimes in which different strategies are used; preferably a mix of strategies (e.g. 
Hawkins, 1984; Hawkins and Thomas, 1984; Parker, 2000; Reiss, 1984; Shapiro and Rabinowitz, 2000; 
Tyler, 1990). 
A ground-breaking move away from the traditional command-and-control regime can be 
found in Ayres and Braithwaite’s model of responsive regulation. Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) state 
that rejecting punitive regulation is naïve, however, total commitment to it might lead to 
unnecessary employment of means. Based upon prior empirical research in pharmaceutical 
companies, coal mining companies by Braithwaite (1984; 1985) and Australian business regulatory 
agencies by Grabosky and Braithwaite (1986) the authors of the responsive regulation model state 
that a strategy based upon punishment as first choice is unaffordable, unworkable and 
counterproductive (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992: 26). Instead of aiming at compliance through 
deterrence-based strategies, the authors promote the use of different, less punitive and less 
restrictive, strategies and preferably mix different strategies: ‘the trick of successful regulation is to 
establish a synergy between punishment and persuasion’ (ibid: 25). Responsive regulation differs 
from the traditional command-and-control regime in what triggers a regulatory response and what 
this response will be (ibid: 4). The relationship between controller and subject and the controller’s 
ability to choose between different sanctions is regarded as the strength of this model. (Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite, 2002).  
 
Concentrating on risks 
 
From the 1980s onwards, risk reduction is given a more and more important role in discussions on 
regulation and a shift towards so-called risk-based regulation can be perceived (Hood et al., 2001; 
Hutter, 2005). The emergence of this enforcement strategy has been addressed in a number of 
studies (e.g. Baldwin and Cave, 1999; Baldwin et al., 2000; Braithwaite, 2000; Sparrow, 2000). Risk is 
often defined as ‘the probability that a particular adverse event will occur during a given period of 
time, or result from a particular challenge’ (Baldwin and Cave, 1999: 138). Risk-based regulation aims 
at setting standards, collecting information, influencing and changing behaviour (Hood et al., 2001), 
and aiming enforcement resources at those subjects that create greatest risk (Baldwin, 2006). Risk-
based regulation differs from traditional regulation, because it is not based upon the input of an 
activity – prescribing what to do, or which standards to meet – but based upon its output – the risk it 
causes. Another difference between traditional regulation is its non-deterministic character: 
traditional regulation aims at reducing non-compliance to zero, whereas risk-based regulation 
accepts that risks do exist and that some risks are inevitable, but tries to reduce these risks to a 
minimum (Seiler, 2002). 
Risk-based regulation is said to have both advantages and disadvantages. It is often perceived 
as more effective and efficient, as priority is given to certain enforcement activities; and as more 
legitimate, as certain choices are more analytically-based (Hutter, 2005). Nevertheless, these choices 
Van der Heijden and De Jong (2013) A better understanding of building regulation – page 7 of 17 
 
 7 
are particularly viewed as the down-side of risk-based regulation, as it is impossible to determine a 
risk objectively (Baldwin and Cave, 1999: 142; Baldwin et al., 2000; Hutter, 2005). In addition, the 
analytical approach of defining risks, by combining chance and effect, may therefore give a false 
sense of security (Rothstein et al., 2006). Furthermore, a false sense of security may arise when the 
system is ‘too literally and slavishly believed in’ (Hutter, 2005: 13) and, once risks are determined, 
the system might be blind to new risks (Baldwin, 2006). Finally, it is questionable if risk-based 
regulation has to be experienced as an (other) enforcement strategy or ‘a methodical tool into which 
political judgments may be explicitly incorporated’ (Flüeler and Seiler, 2003: 228). 
 
2.4 Enforcement style 
 
The term enforcement style is often used to characterise an inspector’s behaviour towards a 
regulatee (e.g. Bardach and Kagan, 1982: 72; Hutter, 1997). In regulatory literature, a wide variety of 
possible enforcement styles are described. Based on the responsive regulation philosophy (Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992), these styles seem to fit on a sliding scale that is defined by a consulting, 
facilitative approach at one end and a rigid, legalistic approach at the other end. A wide-ranging mix 
of enforcement styles that fit on this scale has been described by different authors (for an overview, 
see May and Wood, 2003). 
 Authors appear to have different opinions regarding the actual effect of an inspector’s 
enforcement style on the compliance behaviour of the regulatee (e.g. May and Wood, 2003; Nielsen, 
2006). From research by May (2004) on compliance with building regulations by building contractors 
in the US home building industry, it is concluded that negative compliance motivations are influenced 
by inspection practices, whereas affirmative motivations are mostly influenced by attitudes and 
beliefs of law-subjects and by their knowledge of the rules. For example, a facilitative style fostered 
affirmative motivations while detracting from negative motivations and a formalistic style detracted 
from affirmative motivations – no evidence was found for the influence of a formalistic style on 
negative motivations. Important conclusions drawn from this research are the insight (and empirical 
proof) that different motivations can be addressed to get compliance; that the role of the inspector 
does influence compliance motivations; and that compliance motivations are also being influenced 
by the possible loss of reputation among peers.  
These first two conclusions appear partly to underpin the strength of the responsive 
regulation model. However, from the research in the US home building industry, it was found (May 
and Wood, 2003: 135) that ‘homebuilders learn to roll with the punches and do little to adjust their 
compliance behaviour when faced with different enforcement styles.’ Furthermore, from empirical 
research in the agricultural sector (May and Winter, 2000; Winter and May, 2001), it is learned that 
fair and regular controls offer more perspective than varying enforcement styles, thus backing some 
of the strengths that Ayres and Braithwaite ascribe to their model of responsive regulation. We also 
learn that sanctioning has a turning-point, after which counter-productive effects are gained: more 
sanctioning will encounter resistance. This said, an overly informal relationship between controller 
and subject could bring about negative results when the possibility to sanction is not being used 
(ibid).  
A study by Imrie (2004) amongst building regulatory inspection officers in the United 
Kingdom gives notable insight into these officers’ daily practices. According to Imrie (ibid: 431), 
inspection officers use harsh enforcement means and penalties as a last resort. This is due to a 
competitive regime under which contractors can decide to use another building control department 
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or even private sector agencies to carry out the control function. The possibility of losing a client 
appears to be a strong restriction on the building control department’s freedom of choosing a style. 
  
2.5 Enforcement actors 
 
What has not been addressed yet is the agency’s or inspector’s background. Implicit enforcement has 
been ascribed as a task for public agencies and public inspectors. However, in daily practice, many 
examples of private sector involvement in regulatory enforcement regimes can be found – building 
regulatory enforcement included, as already illustrated in the introduction of this paper. Important 
differences can be found between private agencies and public agencies (Wilson, 1989: 169). A first is 
that private agencies must survive by attracting clients and contributors – note that a public agency 
sometimes ‘must cope with a clientele not of their own choosing’ (ibid). A second is that private 
agencies face fewer constraints in using or disposing of capital and labour than public agencies (ibid: 
chapter 7). Bearing in mind these kinds of differences, it could be argued that the public and private 
agents and agencies have different strengths and weaknesses, which might make them more or less 
suitable for carrying out certain building regulatory enforcement tasks. This brings us to the fourth 
and final discussion in regulatory literature that we would like to introduce: enforcement actors. 
The term enforcement actor is used to indicate the agents and agencies that carry out the 
actual enforcement tasks. An influential work in which the idea of enforcement actors is addressed 
was published in 1998 by Gunningham and Grabosky: Smart Regulation. In their work, Gunningham 
and Grabosky divide the regulatory process into parties, roles and interactions (Gunningham and 
Grabosky, 1998: chapter 3). The focus on the possibility of different parties in the process has, in 
particular, been a move away from the traditional idea on regulatory regimes that, according to 
Gunningham and Grabosky, considered the regulatory process to be too much of ‘a dance between 
two participants – government and business’ (ibid: 93).  
 The key to the smart regulation philosophy is to have those actors involved in the regulatory 
process that are best suited to enforce regulations. Sometimes this may be through traditional public 
agencies; sometimes through self-regulatory or co-regulatory initiatives in which private sector 
actors enforce their own body; sometimes through third parties, such as consumer interest groups 
that act as ‘surrogate controllers’. However, from extensive empirical research (ibid: 137-372), it is 
established that involving ‘surrogate controllers’ is more efficient when large companies are involved 
and when non-compliance is easy to notice in these participants and parties. For instance, for an 
ordinary citizen it might be easy to notice violation of planning regulations when a building is built 
where it is not supposed to; yet, violation of technical building regulations when the wrong type of 
glazing is used might be hard or even impossible to notice as that same citizen does not have the 
necessary technical knowledge or experience to do so. Griffiths’ ‘theory of the social working of legal 
rules’ underpins the idea that compliance with regulations not only comes from professional bodies 
enforcing regulations, but that other actors have a strong influence on compliance motivation as well 
(Griffiths, 2003). 
 
Private sector involvement in regulatory regimes: self regulation 
 
The notions of ‘substitute controllers’ and self-regulatory or co-regulatory initiatives in the regulatory 
process are not unique as such. Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) and Braithwaite (1982, 1984, 1985) 
already noticed ‘public enforcement of privately written rules’ and ‘publicly mandated and publicly 
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monitored private enforcement of those rules’ (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992: 116). Based on these 
insights, Ayres and Braithwaite introduce the concept of ‘enforced self-regulation’ (Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992: chapter 4; Braithwaite, 1982). Within this model, a government body is 
overseeing the process of self-control; and government and individual companies make agreements 
on compliance. These individual companies have to determine if regulations are being complied with 
and have to set up protocols to deal with the non-compliance. 
 In regulatory literature, self-regulation is often believed to be the opposite to traditional 
command and control regimes  and the two are frequently regarded as the limits of a continuum or 
sliding scale of regulatory regimes (Price and Verhulst, 2000; Sinclair, 1997). Self-regulation is said to 
have both advantages and disadvantages (cf. Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992: chapter 4; Baldwin and 
Cave, 1999: 124-133; Fairman and Yapp, 2005; Griffiths, 2003: 57; Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998: 
52-56). Relevant expertise and knowledge of the ‘own’ body, and specialist technical expertise are 
seen as major advantages of self-regulation. It is believed that a self-regulatory organisation knows 
more about its sector than a public authority ever could. Furthermore, self-regulators are considered 
to have more easy access to those under control and can get the information they need at a lower 
cost. Finally, organisations are considered to show a high level of acceptance as they are subject to 
‘their own’ rules.  
Conversely, mandate claims are seen as problematic; the introduction of individuals or 
organisations that have no democratic legitimacy with which to exercise enforcement makes it hard 
to justify that the public interest is being served. Also, the accountability of self-regulators seems to 
be questionable: the risk of capture might weaken the model, as do both the potential lack of public 
belief in the scheme and the possible exclusion of organisations that are not part of the self-
regulatory system. Finally, the economic circumstances that might stimulate companies to 
implement self-regulation and the knowledge and willingness within an organisation to implement 
self-regulation might be lacking. Nevertheless, in terms of management and efficiency, different 
authors claim that self-regulation, or a certain type of self-regulation, and formal legal systems work 
best when they are combined (for an overview, see Doyle, 1997: 35-42). 
The concept of self-regulation is, however, comprehensive, and an unambiguous definition 
seems difficult to make. Self-regulation can, in a broad sense, be considered to be taking place when 
a group of firms or individuals exercise control over its own membership and their behaviour 
(Baldwin and Cave, 1999: 125), but often with a certain amount of government concern 
(Gunningham and Rees, 1997: 365). But then: what is the amount of control needed to call it self-
regulation? This question seems to have been an ongoing debate in regulation literature for some 
time now, with a number of authors participating (e.g. Husye and Parmentier, 1990; Price and 
Verhulst, 2005; Price and Verhulst, 2000; Rees, 1988; van den Heuvel, 1994). Most authors draw up a 
number of sub-models or types of self-regulation based on a certain degree of private sector 
involvement in enforcing public regulations. However, the range of this ‘certain degree’ is a broad 
one as it starts straight where command-and-control ends and continues to the point of no external 
governmental involvement at all – a continuum. The different in-between models or types do not all 
cover the same range of private sector involvement, have varying definitions and are sometimes 
given the same, or similar names when having dissimilar characterizations. Due to this lack of 
cohesion in self-regulatory literature, it seems difficult to compare the sub-models or types. In figure 
1 this lack of cohesion is illustrated by placing some authors’ typologies on a continuum. 
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Figure 1 – a continuum of regulatory regimes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nonetheless, when taking a look at key-features, it seems possible to split up the mentioned 
continuum in a rough categorization: sub-models or types that are characterized by more 
government involvement than non-government involvement and sub-models or types that are 
characterized by non-government involvement that government involvement. It might well be 
possible to come to a more sophisticated division of sub-categories, yet, that would be beyond the 
scope of this paper. It is presupposed that the advantages and disadvantages mentioned have the 
strongest impact on the second category mentioned.  
 
 
3 Three examples: changes in regulatory regimes in New Zealand, Canada and the Netherlands 
 
As stated in the introduction, world wide building regulatory regimes are subject to change due to, 
for example, the introduction of private sector involvement. In this section I briefly discuss and 
consider three examples of building regulatory regimes in which a move away from the traditional 
command and control regime has been made or will be made shortly towards self-regulation. We use 
terminology and concepts discussed in the previous section. 
 
3.1 A combination of issues in New Zealand 
 
A study on the building assessment system in New Zealand shows a worst case-scenario, which Peter 
May addresses as ‘The Saga of the Leaky Buildings’ (2003). In a relatively short period of time, the 
New Zealand government made two major changes in building regulation. The first was a change in 
the actual building regulations from prescriptive to performance-based regulation, the Building Act of 
1991. The second was the introduction of (competitive) private sector building controls. The Act 
provided broad objectives and details for verifying compliance, but it did not specify requirements 
for on-site construction assessment (May, 2003: 392). The building regulatory reforms in New 
Zealand embraced ‘the faith in the market and limited government intervention’ (ibid). At the same 
time, the development market changed: there was a strong increase in the demand for domestic 
building and consumers started to prefer so-called “Mediterranean style” homes characterised by 
plaster and adobe finishes (ibid: 392-393). The competitive marketplace responded by shifting from 
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commercial to domestic development and started building with cost-efficient and low-maintenance 
building materials. In the wet climate of New Zealand, the combination of regulatory changes and 
changes in the development market led to problems with the weathertightness of buildings (ibid: 
393): moisture crept through the cladding of the newly built buildings into the structure resulting in 
‘cracking and eventually the partial or total collapse of the building.’ It is suggested that up to 18,000 
homes and numerous multi-unit buildings have been affected in this “Leaky Building Crisis”. 
Two major inquiry reports (Hunn, 2002; Yates, 2003) state that a combination of issues – 
amongst which, a lack of performance criteria; a lack of standards that could serve as acceptable 
solutions; differences in building plan approval between jurisdictions; local public authorities carrying 
out a harsher enforcement style than private sector agencies; the freedom of developers to choose 
between jurisdictions and enforcement agencies – led to a ‘race to the bottom in building approval 
standards’ (May, 2003: 395). 
 
3.2 Positive experiences in Canada 
 
In the City of Vancouver a regime has been introduced under which architects and engineers can be 
allowed to assess building plans and buildings under construction (CCP, 2003). In order to do so 
architects and engineers have to be certified by the City. The City runs the certification scheme, 
provides training and sets exams. Passing the exam, partaking in continuous professional 
development, and holding a personal indemnity insurance policy is required to obtain certification. 
Once certified architects and engineers are only allowed to carry out statutory building assessment 
of complex building works. The City maintains involvement in all projects that are subject to this 
variance of private sector assessment through communication with and supervision of the private 
agents involved. The City maintains responsibility for issuing building and occupancy permits. 
 In order to make private sector involvement attractive to permit applicants the City offers a 
40% permit fee refund if an applicant chooses private sector involvement. The City furthermore will 
issue a building permit within a week after receipt of the private agent’s statement of a project’s 
compliance; permit issuance might take up to 12 weeks if statutory building assessment is carried out 
by a City’s building official. 
 The private sector agent can be considered an intermediary between the design-team and 
the City. The regime is valued positively (BCMH, 2007). Currently roughly 90% of all complex 
construction work is being assessed by private sector agents. The City does not have to maintain a 
large and specialized staff; peaks in permit applications can be levelled out; assessment of minor 
construction work can still be carried out as under the old regime; and, due to private sector 
involvement, the City reduces its liability exposure as the more complex – the more risky – buildings 
are being assessed by other actors. Some municipalities have already introduced or are considering 
the introduction of a comparable regime (ibid). 
 
3.3 Future developments in the Netherlands 
 
When looking at the formal Dutch building regulations and building control many characteristics of a 
strict command-and-control regime can be detected (van der Heijden et al., 2006): building 
regulations are compulsory imposed by the Dutch national government, all subjects and cases should 
be treated equally, enforcement of building regulations is largely being executed by governmental 
agencies and non-compliance will be sanctioned. Formal enforcement of building regulations seems 
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to aim at compliance through means of fear of sanctioning by imprisonment or penalties – negative 
incentives. However, when looking at the actual execution of building control (van der Heijden et al., 
2007) divergence from this strict command-and-control regime can be perceived. In daily practice 
local building control authority employees seem to choose a persuasive and instructive attitude in 
order to gain compliance with regulations.  
Recently, changes have been introduced in the Dutch building regulatory regime (van der 
Heijden, 2007): with the introduction of certified private building control surveyors a move into the 
field of self-regulation has been made. Yet, as the national government maintains a strong role in 
both the design and implementation of building regulations and the enforcement of regulation, it can 
be argued that the type of self-regulation chosen is but a careful move into the area of ‘more 
government than non-government involvement’. Only the allocation of enforcement officers seems 
to get changed by regulating (entry) requirements for private building control surveyors – no change 
seems to be made with respect to the content of actual enforcement.  
Another change in the Dutch building regulatory regime is an initiative by the Netherlands 
Association of Building Inspectorates to introduce a risk-based inspection protocol (ibid). Projects 
that are expected to form a high risk will be subject to strict enforcement; projects that are expected 
to form a lesser or no risk, for instance minor construction work such a small alterations to houses – 
approximately 80% of all permits applied for – will be subject to little enforcement or an 
administrative procedure only. Yet, no further movement from the strict command-and-control 
system is expected as the risk-based instrument will not change the system of daily practice. Only the 
process will change. Through acceptance of the instrument national government appears to 
formalize and justify the present informal practice at a municipal level. 
 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
A large body of regulatory literature has been discussed in this paper; and, concepts and terminology 
discussed has been applied to three international cases of building regulations and building 
regulatrory enforcement. Based on the discussion, a number of propositions can be drawn up with 
regards to changes in building regulatory regimes. These propositions might be a point of departure 
for future research on such building regulatory regimes. 
 Based on the notions of the quality of law it might be expected that performance-based 
building regulations on the one hand enhance adaptability of the regulations, but on the other have a 
negative impact on the certainty of regulations: it might become unclear to enforcers, but also to 
regulatees subject to regulations, to evaluate or indicate compliance with regulations. The New 
Zealand and US cases discussed once more underline the need for evaluation criteria to assess 
performance requirements. Too much freedom due to too loose performance criteria might 
undermine the goal of building regulations: guaranteeing both individual and public interests. 
From the notions of enforcement strategies it became clear that full compliance with 
building regulations is difficult to measure. This indicates that building regulatory regimes hold an 
implicit risk:  uncertainty of compliance. Based on the notions on enforcement strategies it might be 
expected that enforcement based on positive incentives has a more positive influence on a 
regulatee’s willingness to comply than enforcement based on negative incentives. Incentives such a 
permit fee reduction as in the Canadian case might very well persuade building permit applicants to 
involve specialized actors in the application process. Mixing strategies and responding to actual 
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circumstances instead of strictly following protocols appears the most ideal enforcement strategy for 
the enforcement of work under construction. By using risk based strategies for making decisions on 
enforcement measures it is expected that limited resources can be implemented to result in 
maximum outcomes: ‘the biggest bang for the regulatory buck’ regulatory scholars would say (e.g. 
Gunningham, 2002: 5; Sparrow, 2000: 34). 
 Based on the notions of enforcement styles it might be expected that a facilitative 
enforcement style has a more positive influence on a regulatee’s willingness to comply than a 
formalistic style: for example in the US and Dutch cases discussed, inspectors experience that 
‘consulting’ is more likely to result in compliance than ‘policing’. A too formalistic style was however 
found to result in negative effects and from the notions on responsive regulation it seems that 
inspectors should have a ‘stick’ at hand – and use it – when needed. The strength of harsh sanctions, 
even when these are not imposed, should not be underestimated: ‘Paradoxically, the bigger and the 
more various the sticks, the greater the success regulators will achieve by speaking softly’ (Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992: 19). 
Based on notions of enforcement actors it might be expected that a mix of public and private 
sector inspectors, as for example in the Canadian case, will result in the most optimal building 
regulatory regime. Issues were found when only public or only private sector involvement was 
implemented. Note that competition for clientele between the public and the private sector, as 
illustrated in the UK and New Zealand cases, appears to result in issues with enforcement as the loss 
of clientele might be a negative incentive to the inspection agencies involved. The strength of the 
Canadian case appears to be the complementary relationship between the City of Vancouver and the 
private sector inspectors involved. 
A last concluding proposition: changing a building regulatory regime implies making 
tradeoffs. For example, prescriptive regulation might be easier to enforce than performance-based 
regulation as compliance criteria are clear, it will not stimulate permit applicants to come up with 
innovative solutions. Then, command and control enforcement might give authorities a theoretical 
possibility of total enforcement, it is however costly and time consuming for both enforcer and 
regulatee. Finally, competition between the public and private sector might result in a relatively 
cheap enforcement procedure for permit applicants involved, at question is: at what social costs?  
A better understanding of building regulation might give insight in these tradeoffs and might 
help in the search for ‘optimal’ building regulation. Current literature in the field of building 
regulation seems however to be lacking unambiguous definitions and typology, thereby making 
comparative research of building regulatory regimes difficult, if not impossible. If we want to gain a 
better understanding of changes in the field of building regulation and move beyond best practice 
descriptions it seems we have to look outside the borders of ‘the construction and building 
technology category’. Not only to learn from research in other fields of public policy, but also to show 
others the value and importance of research in the field of building regulation. 
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